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Imperialism and the Dilemma of Slavery
in Eastern Arabia and the Gulf, 1873-1939
MATTHEWS. HOPPER*

An Ethiopian man named Surur appeared before the British Consul at Addis
Ababa in December 1933 and told a remarkable story. He had just returned
to Ethiopia after enduring more than five years of slavery in the Arabian
(Persian) Gulf where he had been forced to work as a pearl diver. When he
was eleven years old and out tending cattle in the Wallamo region of Ethiopia
around 1925, he was seized by kidnappers who took him to Tajura on the
Somali coast and shipped him along with fifty other captives to Jedda, where
he was sold to a man who took him to Qatar and eventually sold him to a
pearl merchant who engaged him as a diver. As Surur explained to the con
sul, he tried twice to escape from his master. The first time, he fled to the
British Residency Agent, 'lsa bin 'Abdullatif, in Dubai, who promised to pro
tect him, but then returned him to his master, who severely beat him. Shortly
after, he fled to the British agency office in Sharjah, only to find that the
Residency Agent was the same 'lsa bin 'Abdullatif, who again returned him
to his master, who this time beat him until he was unconscious. Surur final
ly managed to escape by fleeing to a boat bound for Basra. There, he met
some Somali men working as stokers on a British steamer who assisted him
in getting to Djibouti by way of Muscat. When he arrived in Djibouti he was
interrogated by port officers, and his story was passed on to the British con
sul at Addis Ababa who interviewed him and forwarded his story to the
Political Agent at Muscat. 1

No one in the Persian Gulf Administration would have been surprised to hear
Surur's story or to learn that the slave trade and the institution of slavery
endured in the Gulf into the 1930s. 2 Despite the fiery antislavery rhetoric of
the nineteenth century and the aggressive, highly-publicized antislavery
patrols of the Royal Navy in the Western Indian Ocean, British antislavery
measures diminished rapidly after 1890. The slave trade from East Africa to
the Gulf persisted, a fact which was evidenced by the Gulf Political Resident's
discovery in 1900 that at least 1 ,000 enslaved Africans were still annually
imported to the Ornani port of Sur, the capture by Portuguese forces of more
than 100 men from Sur shipping more than 700 enslaved Africans (mostly
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Makua) from the Mozambique coast in 1902, and the intermittent arrival at
British agencies and ships of newly-imported slaves seeking manumission.
What changed in the late nineteenth century was not the slave trade into the
Gulf or the institution of slavery, but British responses to the problem.3
The persistence of the slave trade decades after it was officially abolished
by treaties, particularly the treaties with the Sultans of Zanzibar and Muscat
in 1873 and increased naval patrols between 1868 and 1888, might seem
out of place to anyone familiar with the adage that the Gulf in nineteenth and
early twentieth century was a 'British lake'. 4 Great Britain had, after all, been
at the forefront of the global antislavery movement, had negotiated a series
of treaties with local rulers and had embarked on a naval crusade for the
express purpose of ending the slave trade from East Africa to Gulf. Viscount
Palmerston, when Foreign Secretary in 1846 pledged that Great Britain was
'the main instrument in the Hands of Providence' to 'put an end to the African
Slave Trade', and he urged the political agent for Muscat and Zanzibar to
impress upon 'these Arabs' that it was 'in vain' for them 'to endeavour to
resist the consummation of that which is written in the Book of Fate' and that
they 'ought to bow to Superior Power, to leave off a pursuit which is doomed
to annihilation'. 5 In spite of nineteenth-century hyperbole, the suppression of
the slave trade had by the end of the century yielded to other priorities. This
paper seeks to situate the dilemma of slavery in the Gulf in the context of the
British Persian Gulf Administration's conflicting commitments to antislavery
and free markets.
The Nature of the Dilemma
Slavery posed a dilemma for the British in the Gulf: a conflict between the
objectives of liberal politics and liberal economics. On one hand, the admin
istration was committed by treaty and popular sentiment at home to the sup
pression of the slave trade. On the other hand it was committed to the main
tenance of free trade and tranquillity of Gulf waters. These goals conflicted
because the Gulf's two largest export products -pearls and dates -relied
heavily on slave labour. Gulf officials feared that completely suppressing the
slave trade and outlawing slavery as an institution would severely restrain
production of those products in the Gulf, limit exports, reduce revenues, and
consequently retard imports, thereby making the administration so unpopu
lar as to make its rule untenable. The primary goal of the administration in
the Gulf was always to protect the route to India by opposing the establish
ment of any potentially threatening forces in the Gulf. The goal of second
importance wavered between the suppression of slavery and the protection
and encouragement of free trade.
By the late nineteenth century, antislavery had taken a back seat to both
free trade and the protection of India as a result of three factors. The first of
these was the growing threat of imperial competition in the Gulf. The Gulf
was too close to India for the British to tolerate the significant naval presence
of any other imperial power. However, the Gulf was positioned at the conflu
ence of empires and increasingly developed into a contested maritime
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space, particularly after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. As one
British naval commander noted following a Turkish warship's entry into the
Gulf in 1871, the opening of the Suez Canal had its 'shady side, and for the
pre-eminence we have held in the Gulf since the decline of the Portuguese
power, a very shady side'. While most European powers had little interest in
the Gulf, he explained, 'for Russia on one side of this Gulf and Turkey on the
other, there appear much attraction'. Russia, he suspected, sought an
arrangement with Persia for access to a port on its coast, most likely Bandar
Abbas, giving Russia access to a warm water port in place of the Black Sea
access lost from the Crimean War. The Ottoman Empire, the commander
suspected, had designs on unifying the Arabian Peninsula under its rule for
the symbolic value to Muslims worldwide and to compensate for lost territo
ry in Europe. With the opening of the Suez Canal, the Ottomans could easi
ly send troops and supplies to Arabia by steamer and were beginning to
reassert their control over the Eastern Arabian province of Hasa from Basra.
'I cannot help thinking that the Sultan and the Czar understand each other
remarkably well', the commander continued. He suspected that the two
empires were sending ships into the Gulf 'as a 'feeler' -just to see how far
we shall take notice or object to this invasion of a sea in which for many
years we have held undisputed sway'. 6
A second factor was the annexation of Zanzibar as a protectorate. With the
declaration of the British protectorate at Zanzibar in 1890, reports on the
slave trade to the Gulf declined sharply, not because the trade itself had dis
appeared, but because publicity about the persistence of the slave trade
would have prejudiced imperial interests. Great Britain had taken a leading
role in the antislavery movement and was still in the process of negotiating
its imperial claims in East Africa vis-a-vis Portugal, France, and Germany.
The persistence of slavery within a British protectorate (as opposed to a
sphere of influence) would have embarrassed the government, further
inflamed antislavery activists in Britain, and reinforced Portuguese mistrust
of British motives in East Africa. British equivocation on abolition was not
limited to East Africa or the Gulf; similar behaviour can also be detected in
India and northern Nigeria. 7
A third and greater factor was the changing reality of the Gulf economy.
Demand for labour in the Gulf, particularly young male labour, was on the
increase in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of
the twentieth century with the dramatic expansion of the Gulf pearl industry
and date industry. The volume of dates imported into the United States,
which came almost exclusively from Basra and Muscat, increased more than
six-fold between 1894 and 1925. 8 The global market for pearls grew steadi
ly from 1885 to 1906, and then skyrocketed'between 1910 and 1914. The
value of Bahrain's pearl exports alone increased five-fold between 1909 and
1913. In 1906, just before the biggest leap in global pearl prices, the value
of pearl productidn in the Gulf was equal to that of all other areas of the world
combined.9 A leading Parisian pearl merchant estimated that, at the peak of
the pearl market, eighty percent of the natural pearls consumed in the West
came from the Gulf. 10 As a result of increased demand for labour in these
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sectors, the importation of slave labour, first from East Africa and later from
Baluchistan and Persian Makran, had become a profitable enterprise. Young
men were increasingly kidnapped and brought to the Gulf and put to work in
the pearl fisheries and date plantations. The testimonies of manumitted
slaves at the offices of the British consulate in Muscat, the Political Agent at
Bahrain, and the Residency Agent at Sharjah from 1921 to 1940 are filled
with stories of men who were kidnapped from East Africa as children and
forced to work in the pearl banks when they reached maturity. 11
Symptoms of the Dilemma
Symptoms of the confusion of British policy toward slavery in the Gulf were
apparent at various levels, none more obvious than the actions of the Royal
Navy. Naval patrols were instructed under an 1875 circular to avoid accept
ing fugitive slaves aboard British ships except under life-and-death circum
stances. 'The broad rule to be observed', the circular explained, 'is that a
fugitive Slave should not be permanently received on board any description
of ship under the British flag, unless his life would be endangered if he were
not allowed to come on board'. The reason for this, the statement continued,
was that accepting fugitives in other cases would result in encouraging the
breaking of the laws of the countries where slaves were 'legally owned'. The
letter continued:
For it might happen, to take an extreme instance, that the whole
slave portion of the crews of vessels engaged in the Pearl Fishery in
the Persian Gulf might take refuge on board British Ships, and if free
there, their masters would be entirely ruined, and the mistrust and
hatred caused in their minds would be greatly prejudicial to British
interests. 12
This logic followed an incident a few years earlier when, during the pearling
season of 1873, an enslaved man who had been out diving for pearls near
the island of Zairku, swam off from one of the seventy-three fishing boats
lying near the HMS May Frere and begged protection. The First Assistant
suggested that once the man had been admitted on board he was entitled to
protection, so he allowed him to stay. As soon as word reached the captains
of the pearling boats, they weighed anchor for fear of other slaves fleeing or
retribution from the Royal Navy for having slaves among their crews. In
debating the legality of the officer's judgment, Edward C. Ross, the Political
Resident, conjectured that if commanders made a habit of accepting run
away slaves at the pearl banks, 'where the diving was carried on almost
entirely by domestic slaves, who if they found an opportunity might run off
to a British vessel, a general feeling of consternation and disgust would be
produced, and we should no longer be regarded as the friendly protectors of
the maritime Arabs'. The Home Government agreed that if runaway slaves
found refuge on British ships, then 'their masters would be entirely ruined',
which would destroy British material interests 'by the mistrust and hatred
which would be occasioned'. 13
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Even the Royal Navy's celebrated antislavery efforts in the Western Indian
Ocean were ineffective and chronically under-funded. Since the East Indies
Station, which after 1867 coordinated antislavery duties in the Indian Ocean,
was required to have six ships around India at all times, the antislavery
squadron rarely consisted of more than three regular ships to patrol 4,000
kilometres (2,500 miles) of coastline.'• When Admiral Cockburn entreated
the Admiralty board in 1871 for more ships and resources for antislavery
duties in the Indian Ocean, the Admiralty noted that 'the Treasury have pos
itively decided not to sanction any increased charge for suppression of the
slave trade at present, consequently no object appears gained by discussing
what might be done with an increased force' .15
East India Station orders for 1877 urged captains to follow the letter of
each antislavery treaty carefully and, while bearing in mind the importance
of using 'the most zealous exertions' for putting an end to the slave trade,
they were to 'observe the greatest care and vigilance not to exceed the pro
visions' of the treaties, and not to afford any foreign governments 'any just
cause of complaint' for their actions. With regard to boarding dhows show
ing French flags, 'enquiry into any matter beyond her nationality is strictly
forbidden', and special rules were to be followed since the 'boarding of
Vessels flying the French Flag is almost invariably attended with some future
litigation'. Furthermore, captains were to bear in mind that the 'right of vis
iting vessels suspected of fraudulently using the French Flag ceases alto
gether within a three miles' range of land', and it would be 'most discourte
ous and improper' to exercise this right when 'in sight of a French Flag' fly
ing on the shore. 16
In spite of ample evidence that French flags were being illegally used to
protect slave traders, the Royal Navy continued to respect the sovereignty of
the French flag until the British government challenged the French in the
Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague in 1904. 17 ln 1863 a dhow with
French papers was known to have shipped nearly 300 slaves from Kilwa in
coastal East Africa to Shihr in the Hadhramaut while flying a French flag.'"
In February 1871, when the HMS Columbine approached two dhows, one
with a red (Arab) flag and the other with a French flag, the captain of the
dhow with the red flag transferred the slaves he had aboard to the dhow with
the French flag to avoid having them captured. 19 The boatswain on the HMS
Star recalled in the vessel's logbook, that during patrol the commander
refused to board dhows which passed them flying the French flag off the
coast of Brava, in southern Somalia, in November 1867.~0 In the 1880s a
Swahili observer summarized the situation as follows:
Persons who trade in slaves often use the flag of the French to ship
them because the British are not permitted to enter any ship that sails
under the French flag. This is the reason why some Muslims seek the
protection of the French nation. And if they want to hoist the French
flag they pay for it. They pay an annual flag fee [... ] Among those
who hoist the French flag are many Arabs who are called Wasuri.
They frequently ship slaves with their vessels. 21
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Two dhows arrested by the HMS Sphinx in 1896 were found to contain '200
negroes, of whom the greater part must have been slaves', and in June 1900
Indian residents of Sur reported that 1,000 enslaved Africans had been
imported that season, of which 560 were estimated to have been brought by
dhows flying the French flag. The British Consul at Muscat quizzed the 79
slaves who sought manumission at the Muscat consulate between April 1901
and April 1902, and found that forty-nine of them were unaware what flag
they had been brought under and fourteen of the remaining eighteen said
they had been brought under French colours. 22
.
•
Further symptoms of the conflicted approach to slavery could be found m
the attitudes of administration officials toward the institution of slavery.
Administrators believed that slavery was a natural part of Arab life - sanc
tioned by Islam, and that Arabs were naturally lazy, unwilling to perform
manual labour and, therefore, dependant on slave labour. Slavery was
regarded as an ingrained element of the Arab psyche rather than a response
to economic pressures (as in the Atlantic). Consequently, the administration
believed that the institution of slavery would not be given up without violent
enforcement or the passage of many years and the advancement of Arabs to
higher levels of 'civilisation'. Admiral Heath believed the slave trade supplied
'a want which has not been left unsatisfied for many centuries past, a want
which, sanctioned by the religion of the country, has grown almost into an
instinct'. 23 Captain Boyes, the Senior Naval Officer in the Gulf, remarked in
1929 that, 'It may be taken as a general principle that Arabs will not do any
work of a "laboring" kind and from time immemorial have had slaves to do
it for them'. He explained that, 'To attempt to compel Arabia, in its present
state of development, to give up slavery could perhaps be compared with
attempting to compel Glasgow to give up the use of mechanical apparatus
and whisky'. 24
Additionally, administrators viewed Gulf slavery as a tolerable institution
because they believed slavery took a particularly mild form in the Gulf that
could even be beneficial to the enslaved. Several reports reasoned that slav
ery was completely different from Atlantic plantation slavery - labour was
described as undemanding, cruelty was judged to be minimal, and most
slaves appeared to enjoy a quality of life equal to or better than that many
members of the free population of similar class. Some administrators also
believed that freed slaves would be incapable of surviving on their own, most
having been kidnapped as children or born into slavery and not having
known any other state of life. 25 Thus, when political expediency demanded,
officials could easily turn a blind eye to slavery and the slave trade. When a
newly imported Baluchi slave begged for manumission aboard the HMS
Lupin at Sharjah in 1927, the commander decided to yield to the request of
the Sheikh of Sharjah to return the man to his master. He reasoned that, in
view of the R.A.F. negotiations with the sheikh about the establishment of an
airfield at Sharjah, the issue of slavery was better left alone.~
Another symptom of the dilemma presented by slavery was the toleration
of the behaviour of the British Residency Agent at Sharjah, as cases like that
of the Ethiopian man, SurCir, described above, demonstrated. The agency, a
6
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post held by a local Persian resident, had the unenviable position of being the
sole representative of British authority on the Arab coast between Muscat
and Bahrain. As such, the agent was authorized to issue manumission cer
tificates to slaves who sought freedom based on the cruelty of their masters,
but he also had to maintain his position among the residents of Sharjah,
including the Sheikh of Sharjah, the titular head of the Qawasim tribe. For his
efforts the agent received a small monthly allowance and some additional
benefits. 27 Among enslaved Africans the Sharjah agent was notorious for
accepting bribes from slave owners and returning slaves to their masters. His
reputation was such that runaway slaves preferred to walk from Dubai to
Muscat, more than 350 kilometres (220 miles), than to seek the protection
of the agent in neighbouring Sharjah. One runaway, Thani bin Miftah, who
sought freedom from the Political Agent at Muscat in 1928 declared that he
did not go to the Residency Agent at Sharjah 'because whenever a slave
takes refuge with him he takes money from the master and returns the slave
to him'. 28
When runaways reached Muscat from the Truda! Coast, the Political
Agent generally wrote to the Residency Agent at Sharjah seeking confirma
tion of the runaway's story. More often than not, if the runaway was a diver,
the agent replied that he was not in fact a slave, but a free diver who was
indebted to a diving captain or pearl merchant, and requested the Muscat
agent to send the man back to Sharjah for further investigation. The Political
Agent rarely did so. In the case of Thani bin Miftah, the Sharjah agent
claimed that he was in fact a free diver who was indebted to his nakhuda
(captain) for 600 rupees, and he requested Thani be returned to Sharjah. The
Political Resident refused, arguing that Thani had been in Muscat for three
months while he case was being considered, and the nakhuda, 'if he really
considered that his claim was against the negro and not against his alleged
'master' would without doubt have journeyed to Muscat and lodged his com
plaint'. He concluded that it would be 'unwise' to send him back to Sharjah,
since 'it is difficult to find justice there and it is realized that the position of
the Residency Agent is such that he more often than not tries to fall in with
the wishes of the powerful Shaikhs and the Nakhodas'.'"'
In May 1933 a Baluchi man named Ismail swam half a mile from shore to
reach the HMS Bide{ord which was lying off the coast of Sharjah. Once
aboard the sloop, the man explained to the commander that he was the slave
of a local pearl merchant and dhow owner who sent him to dive for pearls
each season and treated him cruelly. Ismail had run away the year before to
the Residency Agent at Sharjah, who had imprisoned him for three days until
his master came and paid fifty rupees. The master then took him home, beat
him, chained him for four days without food, and then sent him to the pearl
banks in his dhow. The commander took pity on Ismail and decided to hold
him until the next day when the Residency Agent was scheduled to come
aboard and could verify his story. The agent denied ever having seen Ismail
before, but the commander observed that when Ismail was confronted with
the agent 'he displayed the most abject terror and stated that he would rather
I cut his throat on the spot than I should send him ashore in his charge. He
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said it would be a repetition of the last time' .JO Hector Boyes, the Senior
Naval Officer of the Persian Gulf Division, once remarked that the Sharjah
agent, 'gives us a sop occasionally of a slave just to keep things quiet. If he
did more, they all agree his life would not be worth five minutes purchase,
and also he has to live and make money' .31
Addressing the Dilemma

Faced with new political and economic realities in the Gulf in the late nine
teenth century, the British Persian Gulf Administration drifted toward tolera
tion of the institution of slavery on the Arabian coast, while encouraging the
already prevalent Muslim practice of manumission by granting official man
umission certificates. As for the slave trade, the administration attempted to
expand and clarify legal rights to search vessels at sea, and dealt sporadical
ly with suspected slave traders and the local rulers nominally responsible for
them by using performative punishment and military display. The ineffec
tiveness of these policies was evidenced by the continuation of both the slave
trade and the institution of slavery well into the twentieth century, and would
only face serious challenge in the 1930s.
The first element of British policy toward slavery was manumission. While
no serious attempt was made to prohibit slavery on the coast, the British
Persian Gulf Administration encouraged manumission by granting manumis
sion certificates modelled on the letters of certification issued by qadhls
throughout Arabia on the manumission of slaves. Manumission was fre
quently granted by slave owners in the Gulf through regular Muslim legal
channels.32 The British manumission certificates were modelled on the lan
guage of equivalent Islamic legal documents and were highly valued by
those who possessed them. The certificates included the name of the freed
person, certification of freedom in English and Arabic, and an official seal.
The certificates were granted through the office of the resident at the request
of the Political Agents of Muscat or Bahrain or the Residency Agent in
Sharjah. Runaway slaves presented themselves at the agencies or consulates
and gave an official statement, generally in the form of answers to a Jist of
questions, and the statement was recorded by a member of the office staff
or the agent himself. When the testimony was completed it was usually
translated, typed, and sent to the Political Resident for approval. In the case
of pearl divers - the most common fugitives seeking manumission - the
Resident often sought verification from local authorities that the diver was
not a freeman with large debts who was seeking manumission to escape his
indebtedness. As free divers were constantly indebted to their captains or
pearl merchants, the process could often take several months to complete.33
Another element of British action against the slave trade was its legal
effort to expand the ability to search foreign vessels at sea. As mentioned
previously, the administration was increasingly aware of the extensive use of
the French flag to protect the slave traders from search by British cruisers.
In 1904, the issue was brought before the Permanent Court of Arbitration at
the Hague, which issued a decision in August 1905. Although ostensibly
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about slave trading, the British case claimed that, in granting flags to dhow
owners from Sur, French authorities undermined the Sultan of Muscat's inde
pendence, which France had pledged to mutually protect under a treaty with
Great Britain in 1862, because the mariners who flew French flags claimed
exemptions from the sultan's taxes. 34 The court was charged with determin
ing the legality of granting French flags to Omani subjects and what rights
were attached to flying the French flag if allowed. The court concluded that
since France had agreed to the terms of the General Act of the Brussels
Conference of 1890, which stipulated that signatory powers could only grant
the use of their flags to vessels which were owned or fitted out by either 'sub
jects of or persons protected by the power whose flag they claim to fly',
France could not grant its flag to Omani dhow owners who were not French
'proteges' after 2 January 1892, the date France ratified the treaty. To answer
the more difficult question of who could constitute proteges, the court looked
to precedent in the case of Ottoman capitulations, which following the
Ottoman law of Sefer 23, 1280 (August 1863), were limited to specific
groups of people, including foreign subjects and those grandfathered into
protection by having ancestors who were protected by foreign powers prior
to the treaty. The court ruled that the cases of Muscat and the Ottoman
Empire were too dissimilar to allow the French to establish Omani proteges
based their having ancestors or relatives who were protected by them as was
the case in Turkey. 'The proteges of the Christian powers in Turkey [were) of
race, nationality and religion different from their Ottoman rulers', the court
explained, 'whilst the inhabitants of Sur and other Muscat people who might
apply for French flags are in all these respects entirely in the same condition
as the other subjects of the Sultan of Muscat.' Therefore the court conclud
ed that France was not entitled to authorize Omani vessels to fly the French
flag after 1892, when it ratified the Brussels Act, and those who had been
granted French flags prior to that date could not pass on that privilege to
their descendents. The case marked a partial victory for Great Britain. 35
Shock and Awe: Military Display as Theatre

In addressing the slave trade, the administration resorted to forms of perfor
mative punishment, often through what is commonly called 'gunboat diplo
macy'.36 In his seminal work on the history of the penal system, Michel
Foucault distinguished between what he called 'discipline blockade', which
places criminality and punishment 'on the edges of the social body', and
'discipline mechanism', characterized by panopticism, which spreads sur
veillance throughout the social body and incorporates the individual subject
into the normalizing regime. The degree of control which Foucault called
'discipline-mechanism', which the British achieved elsewhere in the Middle
East, as Timothy Mitchell has shown for Egypt and Toby Dodge has shown
for Iraq, was not 'achieved in the Gulf states. 37 Rather, British imperial author
ity in the Gulf was limited to what Foucault called 'discipline-blockade' 
exceptional discipline aimed at negative functions: 'arresting evil, breaking
communications, suspending time', characterized by public spectacle,
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theatre, and bodily experience.38 When the British Navy engaged in 'gunboat
diplomacy' in the Gulf, it intended to maximize display to arrest the slave
trade by creating fear of potential bodily consequences of the contravention
of treaties.
In the Gulf, military display took two forms: destructive - involving naval
bombardments typical of gunboat diplomacy elsewhere in the Empire,
destroying forts, watchtowers, and ships - and demonstrative - involving the
personal display of naval grandeur to notables and the public through har
bour visits and walking tours of naval vessels. Destructive and demonstra
tive displays of power were calculated to evince 'shock' and 'awe' respec
tively. When destructive force was employed, it was calculated to maximize
display, through the destruction of a symbolic structure, such as a fort or
watchtower, or the. vehicle for criminal activity, such as a slaving dhow, in as
dramatic a fashion as possible.
A key element of destructive display in the Gulf was the use of Hale's war
rockets. The English inventor, William Hale, improved upon the Congreve
rockets used between the Napoleonic Wars and the Crimean War (and
immortalized in the American national anthem by Francis Scott Key) by dis
pensing with the Congreve's wooden stabilizing sticks, improving the accu
racy by rifling the launch tubes so that the rockets spun in the air, and devis
ing an all-metal construction. By 1867 the British army and navy had for
mally adopted Hale's rockets and began using them in colonial campaigns.
The navy first demonstrated the utility of Hale's rockets in the Abyssinian
campaign of 1868, during which more than 200 were fired. In the army's offi
cial reports on the campaign, the rockets were credited with 'astonishing' the
enemy with their 'roar' and inducing Tewodros to exclaim, 'What a terrible
weapon - who can fight against it?' 39 In the Royal Navy's antislavery cam
paign in the Indian Ocean from 1868 to 1888, Hale's rockets became stan
dard issue. When Captain Malcolm suggested his plan for improving the anti
slavery patrols in East Africa by creating a single depot ship to be based at
Zanzibar supplemented by American-style yachts as patrol boats, he
requested the new ship be equipped with two twenty-four pounder Hale's war
rocket tubes and noted that 'the supply of ammunition, especially rockets to
the guard ship, should be very large'. 40
Describing a Hale's rocket in action against a slaving dhow off the coast
of Oman, Lt. C.M. Gilbert Cooper wrote, 'Few who have seen the war rock
et fired, forget the sensation they experience when hearing it for the first
time, and evidently the shriek and the flame and the smoke of it disconcert
ed them all not a little, and checked all further resistance'. 41 Recalling his
experiences as a junior officer on the HMS Briton while patrolling for slave
traders in the Mozambique Channel in 1873, G. Keith Gordon described the
effectiveness of rockets after residents of a coastal town speared a member
of the boat's crew.
Quite an array of men armed mostly with spears and long swords,
and a few old muskets, danced about the gate, as if they wanted to
stop our entry. They evidently did not realize our strength or power,
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thinking we were going to land. As they were at least five or six times
numerically superior to us, it would not have done for us to have
attempted such a thing. So getting as dose as the depth of the water
allowed, we shelled the village with the pinnace's gun, and the cutter
gave them a few war rockets, setting the place on fire, and frighten
ing them more than the gun did.
These war rockets are much on the same principle as the ordinary
sky rocket, but the composition is enclosed in an iron cylinder, four
inches in diameter and about two feet long with a shell in the head.
They are fired from a long eight foot tube fixed over the side of the
boat. When they strike anything square they drop to the ground, but
if the charge is still burning, they start off again from the ground in
the direction they are pointing, sometimes even back to starting
point; or they will jump about the place like a fire cracker, until the
composition is expended, when the shell at the head explodes, scat
tering the iron everywhere[...]. About ten minutes of this work soon
dispersed the crowd [... ]42
The logic behind such imprecise weapons was to maximize display, rather
than cause death or injury. In this instance, the rockets killed only one mem
ber of the opposing party and injured no one else. With the crowd scattered,
the Briton's boats effected a landing, destroyed the palm trees and crops,
and filled the wells. 'One has to be severe in dealing with these natives',
Gordon explained, 'for leniency makes them think we are afraid of them, and
leads to more trouble. The lesson they got had a very salutary effect for a
long time, as the news of the affair soon spread up and down the coast'. 43
In the Gulf, display, whether with rockets, guns or fire, was intended to
have the same effect: to maximize shock value with a minimum loss of life,
and allow the power of rumour to circulate news of the display. Most often,
these goals were achieved through the bombardment of symbolic structures
such as a particular sheikh's fort or watchtowers. Such actions were contem
plated whenever local rulers were deemed to be particularly uncooperative,
especially on the issue of the slave trade. In May 1921, the Sheikh of Ajman,
Humaid bin Abdulaziz, was accused of re-enslaving a manumitted slave who
had been given a government manumission certificate by the Political
Resident in Bushire four years earlier. Humaid reportedly tore up the certifi
cate and reclaimed the slave as his own. When the Political Resident
received word of the sheikh's defiance, he visited Ajman with two gunboats
and demanded he come aboard and pay a fine of 1,000 rupees within two
hours or face the destruction of his watchtowers. When the sheikh was
deemed 'defiant and recalcitrant' and failed to pay the fine, the HMS
Cyclamen fired and demolished the towers. The fine was brought the same
night. 44 Similarly, on the opposite side of the Mussendam peninsula at
Fujairah, Sheikh Hamad bin Abdullah was accused of purchasing a kid
napped Baluchi girl and giving 'insolent replies' to the Political Resident.
When the Resident, Col. Prideaux, visited Fujairah aboard the HMS
Lawrence, the sheikh refused his demand to come aboard. Thus, in April
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1925, HMS Triad and HMS Cyclamen bombarded the fort of Fujairah and
recovered a fine of 1,500 rupees from the sheikh. 45
A more pressing case involving slavery arose in Sharjah, when the British
Residency Agent reported the following immediately after British warships
left Sharjah in January 1931:
After nightfall when I was asleep in my house suddenly a hue and cry
was heard in the vicinity of the house and the women folk informed
me that Abdur Rahman bin Muhammad accompanied by about a
hundred men, inhabitants of Hirah, had collected in front of the gate
of our house, in our bazaars and on the sea shore in front of our house
and that there existed the Shaikh of Shargah and his fighting men and
they demanded the slaves who had taken refuge with us and that they
were trying to enter the house.' 6
Residency Agent !sa, had taken in six runaway slaves, and had held them in
his compound overnight, as was the official procedure, until he could record
their testimonies and forward the information, if necessary, to Bushire for
adjudication by the Political Resident. Resenting the interference of the agent
in local matters, and perhaps fearing the further flight of valuable pearl divers
and a subsequent loss of income in an increasingly depressed pearl market,
the Sheikh of Sharjah and the crowd demanded the return of the slaves. lsa
reported that one of the local residents convinced the sheikh to desist
'because the Agency is a British Government house' and 'it would bring them
repentance in the end', but while the crowd eventually dissipated, in the fol
lowing days the agent feared for his Iife. 47 The Political Resident suggested to
the Government of India that the sheikh either be deposed in favour of his
uncle, who 'favors the British connection', or be forced to pay a fine of 2,000
rupees and surrender 100 rifles within four days on penalty of the destruc
tion of his towers outside of town. The resident thought that the defence tow
ers, 'situated as they are outside and clear of the village, would be suitable
objectives for the first lesson'. Their 'destruction', he wrote, 'while being
spectacular and within sight and sound of Sharjah, should not be attended
by any loss of life'. Alternatively, his fort 'comes under excellent observation
from a certain anchorage and is an easy target. No other buildings should be
damaged by fire directed at this fort' .'8
On the morning of 11 March 1931, demands were made and the inhabi
tants were warned that the bombardment would begin at midnight if the
sheikh did not pay the required fine. At 1pm, the sheikh arrived on the beach
with 1,200 rupees and sixty rifles. Residency Agent !sa was sent ashore to
tell him that unless he brought the full amount he would not be received. At
9:30 pm he returned with the full fine and 100 old model rifles, but six of the
rifles did not fit the stipulation that they be breach-loading and serviceable,
so the sheikh was ordered to replace them by midnight. An hour before the
deadline he replaced the final six rifles, and destruction was averted.
Afterward, Col. Briscoe, the Political Resident, reflected that 'the promptness
with which action was taken undoubtedly impressed the population'.'9
However, the shelling of forts and the levelling of watchtowers had limited
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impact on groups with no attachment to fixed structures near the shore.
During the short rule of Azan bin Qais over Muscat in the 1860s, the salafist
Mutawwa movement represented one such group. A merchant recounted a
conversation between the head of the garrison at the gate of Muscat and
three followers of the Mutawwa movement. One of the men explained:
The Gunboat has been brought under our Fort to frighten us. We are
afraid of nobody. If twenty Gunboats came we should not be afraid.
Should any calamity overtake us, we know we possess nothing but
the clothes on our back and our words. We know we possess in
Muscat no property no houses no furniture no gardens. Muscat is not
our country nor the country of our fathers, nor the country of Seyid
Azan's father. We shall at once quit the place and bolt.!>()
The threat of force was predominantly applied to rulers who feared the loss
of fixed structures near shorelines, and those who depended on British sup
port to maintain their rule. Others could be influenced by the destruction of
mobile property.
In November 1882, the commander of the HMS Woodlark captured five
vessels which were wanted for plundering in the pearl fisheries. The captain
had the five boats anchored near the man-of-war and burnt them, waiting
until after dark, 'the blaze being distinctly seen far up and down the coast'.
He had four more boats burnt on shore the following morning at dawn, and
remarked that the burning 'appears to have made a great impression'." In
December 1928, the Residency Agent of Sharjah reported to the visiting
Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf that a dhow in Dubai harbour had
been carrying slaves, two women and two boys. The commander-in-chief
elected to destroy the abandoned dhow publicly in order to impress upon
Sheikh of Dubai his responsibility to suppress the slave trade in his territory.
With a large crowd assembled on the shore, and the Sheikhs of Dubai,
Sharjah, Ajman and Omm AI-Qaiwain on hand, the HMS Lupin towed the
dhow a safe distance out to sea and set it ablaze, 'having previously placed
a guncotton charge in her which produced an impressive explosion'. 52 The
following year, when a similar operation was contemplated in Abu Dhabi, the
Senior Naval Officer recalled that there was 'not doubt' that the destruction
of the dhow in Dubai 'was a good object lesson to the coast and the day cho
sen was advantageous as, owing to the presence of the commander-in-chief
many notables from along the coast were assembled in the port'. 53
The second form of display used in the Gulf, demonstrative display, was
designed to secure compliance by creating a sense of awe among local
inhabitants or increasing the prestige of the local ruler with whom the power
was associated. Beginning in 1900, when a Russian gunboat visited a num
ber of ports in the Gulf, the British government made a policy of upstaging
foreign visitors with cruises through the Gulf of the largest British men-of-war
(which were too large to enter many Gulfharbours). Remarking on this phe
nomenon in 1905, the author of the Government of India's Precis on Naval
Arrangements in the Persian Gulf, 1862-1905 explained:
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In recent years, a great deal of importance has been attached by for
eign nations competing with the British in the Persian Gulf to making
display of large men-of-war on its shores. However poorly off these
nations might be at home in the number of such ships, their display
is calculated to make a deep impression upon the natives, who know
nothing of the naval strength of the several powers in Europe except
what they see with their own eyes. Hence, the British Government in
order to counteract the impression produced by the visits of foreign
cruisers in the Gulf, have taken opportunities to dispatch some of
their large vessels to the Gulf."'
In December 1901, the Russian cruiser Varyag entered the Gulf and visited
Muscat, Bandar Abbas, Lingah, Bushire, Muhammerah, Basrah and Kuwait,
and 'made as much display as possible'. Concerned that the Varyag's 'sight
and movements made a deep impression on the people', Col. Kimball, the
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, sought to have a larger British man-of
war on its way to China stop by Muscat and the Gulf. In June 1902, the
11 ,000-ton HMS Amphitrite called at Muscat, and showed its flag at the
major Omani ports of Sur, Seeb and Barka, before calling at Bahrain,
Bushire, Kuwait, the Truda) Coast, and Khor Fakan. It was the biggest
European naval vessel to have ever visited the Gulf. At each port, the cap
tain opened the ship to sightseers and made 'liberal exercise of the search
light to impress the natives' .55 At Muscat, the captain gave the Sultan and his
son, brother, and entourage a tour of the ship and took them out to observe
target practice. Captain Windham recalled in a letter to Admiralty that 'the
firing was good and evidently created an impression'. 56 He reflected that his
call at the Omani ports in Batinah would 'undoubtedly, strengthen the
Sultan's hands in these places as exaggerated reports as to size, armament,
and crew, quickly spread inland'. 57
The following year, the even more impressive HMS Argonaut, accompa
nied by a flotilla of six men-of-war, conveyed Viceroy Curzon on his tour of
the Gulf intended to demonstrate British supremacy to inhabitants of the
major port cities. At Sharjah, Curzon held one of his trademark durbars
aboard the Argonaut, in which local notables were invited to sit in chairs
arranged neatly in rows on a fine assortment of Oriental carpets beneath a
canopy of flags in front of an elevated stage, upon which Curzon sat in a gild
ed throne flanked by uniformed officers while gun turrets loomed in the
background. 56 These conspicuous displays of pomp and power were calcu
lated to convey a looming threat of force, although, in reality, that force could
rarely be applied.
Epilogue

Around the time Surur made his escape back to Ethiopia, two external fac
tors had begun to direct the British administration's gradual policy shift
toward greater effort for abolition. Left to themselves, the administration
would likely have continued their existing policy of largely ignoring slavery,
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but new circumstances required a shift in policy. 59 The first factor came in the
form of the collapse of pearl prices in the wake of the introduction of
Japanese cultured pearls and spread of the global depression of 1929, and
the second came in the form of pressure from the League of Nations begin
ning in 1932. The global market for pearls had begun to decline shortly after
the First World War, largely as the result of the mass marketing of Kokichi
Mikimoto's cultured pearls in Europe and the United States. 60 While in 1906
the value of natural pearls from the Gulf was equal the production of all other
areas of the world combined, the world pearl market of the 1920s was dom
inated by Japanese cultured pearls. The long pearl necklaces, fashion icons
of the 'roaring twenties' in the United States, were largely of Japanese rather
than Arabian manufacture. The value of Gulf pearl exports had fallen to nine
teenth-century levels by 1924, and declined steadily until the start of the
global depression. Exports collapsed to new depths by 1932 and never
recovered. 61 With the collapse of pearl prices, the Gulf pearling industry suf
fered a dramatic shock. Merchants and lenders who had invested heavily in
slave labour, could now no longer afford to maintain their enslaved divers,
and increasingly set them free, reducing the risk to the administration of
becoming unpopular for addressing the issue of slavery.
The second factor came in the form of pressure from the League of
Nations, particularly after the forming of the Advisory Committee of Experts
on Slavery in 1933. As early as 1929, the administration has been pressured
to prepare reports on the status of slavery in the Gulf, which produced a
great deal of fear about negative international attention. 62 The Senior Naval
Officer in the Gulf expressed his worry that if Britain entered into a dispute
with Persia, 'the Persian Government may turn on us and point to the mass
of slavery on the Arabian shores and, if referred to the League of Nations,
would bring out the existing state of affairs'. The whole issue was such a vast
one, he said, 'it looks as if the Government will have to decide as to whether
it is going to allow treaties to be openly flouted. As far as I can judge, to take
action will raise an uproar; but at the same time is Great Britain to tell the
world that they are afraid to put it down?' 63
The British representative to the permanent advisory committee, Sir
George Maxwell, a former chief secretary of the Malay states, adopted a
strategy of pressuring the administration for straight answers about slavery
in the Gulf. As a result, the administration, which was not eager to draw inter
national attention to either the shaky legal claim it held on the Gulf states or
the status of slavery, was forced to produce a number of reports on the issue
and reconsider its position. During the first session of the committee,
Maxwell was embarrassed by the vague answers the administration supplied
and was frustrated by their lack of cooperation. 64 He reported that when the
French member of the committee heard the administration's reply about
British sloops not having captured any slave traders recently, he retorted, 'If
I do not shoot tigers in my jungles, I do not say that that proves that there
are no tigers'. 65
In the 1930s the British Persian Gulf Administration was forced to recon
sider its policy of largely ignoring slavery. However, before substantive
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changes were made on the issue, the dilemma of slavery was complicated
by new pressures arising from early oil concessions and the growth of the
petroleum industry. The dilemma of slavery, which pitted the objectives of
liberal politics against liberal economics for more than half a century, would
wait until after the Second World War for resolution. 56
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This special issue of ltinerario celebrates the thirtieth anniversary of our jour
nal and event that was marked by and coincided with the international, inter
disciplinary conference, 'Culture and Commerce in the Indian Ocean', host
ed at Leiden University, September 25-27, 2006, and co-sponsored by the
University of Technology in Sydney, Australia.
This number opens with an interview by Damian Pargas of Pieter Emmer
(Leiden University), a leading expert on the history of European expansion
and migration history in the Atlantic world, who has been intimately involved
with ltinerario from its very inception. The origins of the Forum 'Colliding
Geographies and the Dilemma of Imperial Authority' can be traced back to
a panel at the 120th Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association
in Philadelphia in January 2006. Preceded by a note from the guest editor,
Linda M. Rupert (University of North Carolina at Greensboro), the forum
consists of five contributions: Jennifer L. Anderson (New York University)
explores the environmental realities and problems of imperial authority in the
Bay of Honduras; Lauren Benton (New York University) discuss the spatial
histories of empire; Lisa Ford (Columbia University) investigates empire and
order on the colonial frontiers of Georgia and New South Wales; Matthew S.
Hopper (University of California, Los Angeles) surveys imperialism and the
dilemma of slavery in eastern Arabia and the Persian Gulf between 1873 and
1939; and Linda Rupert concludes with an investigation of contraband trade
and the shaping of colonial societies in Curac;ao and the Tierra Firme.
The Editors would like to thank Markus Vink (State University of New York
at Fredonia) for arranging the book reviews and review articles. The two
review articles in this issue are: Ronald Jay Morgan (Abilene Christian
University-in-Oxford}, 'How The Other Half Actually Lives: More Historical
Perspectives On Non-Elite Religious and Political Culture in Colonial
Mexico'; and Matthew J. Shaw (The British Library), 'Slave Revolts in the
Revolutionary Caribbean and the Atlantic World'.
We would also like to use this opportunity to thank our readers and con
tributors for their continued support of and submissions to ltinerario through
out these past three decades. We hope that we can count on your continued
support and urge you to encourage others to join as members and contribu
tors. We look forward to providing this unique platform for the foreseeable
and more distant future.
The Editors

